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Abstract 
The world of Internet as such is open and insecure by nature. Companies and organizations exploit enormous possibilities that 
internet offers to build computer systems to enable communication and data sharing capabilities within their corporate platforms. 
In doing so, they continuously strive towards providing a fast, efficient and at the same time secure working environment by 
protecting their organizational assets. Enterprises build their network infrastructure with intention to find reliable solutions to 
protect themselves from untrusted and cybercrime activities. In this sense, Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are primarily 
concerned about Data privacy. VPNs represent an extension of a private network made through added features like encapsulating 
the data packets with a header on both ends, along the lines of the communication as well as throughout setting communication 
tunnels using composite suite of protocols available. This paper offers a set of simulated secure data communication tunnels 
together with a comparison of results of the speed variables measured against the security through different encryption protocols 
between remote LAN’s. These encryption protocols are ran onto distributed queries using various database functions. 
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1. Introduction 
Along with speed, Security is one of the key requirements for business success. Virtual private network (VPN) 
technologies provide a means of secure and private transmission of data over unsecure and shared network 
infrastructure. With the permanent need to raise the business efficiencies in conjunction with greatly reduced IT 
operational expenditures, organizational leaders look into enabling more mobile working patterns for their workforce 
and thus increasing the scope of efficiency and flexible communication channels. They must continue to maximize 
the economies of scope in their existing data infrastructure investments. This paper aims to analyze how VPN enable 
enterprise workforces to share data seamlessly and securely over common yet separately maintained network 
infrastructures, such as through an Internet service provider (ISP) between enterprise networks or with corporate 
extranet partners. (Carmouche, 2006). A Virtual Private Network is Virtual, meaning that the overall bandwidth and 
capacity of the physical infrastructure is transparent to the VPN connection and it can be owned by the Public 
Internet Service Provider. The virtual nature is achieved through the tunneling techniques operated on the upper 
layers. Computer networks in general and VPN networks in particular use encryption protocols to secure their 
exchange of data and information. Depending on the type of dedication, function, its size, services it provides, it can 
choose from a wide range of standards (Ahonen, 2005).  
The most common uses of VPN networks are: LAN-to-LAN (L2L) and the Remote Access (RA) VPN. 
1. The L2L or the Site-to-Site type of a VPN network is to link branch offices or remote, distant offices 
together. It makes it possible for two different sites that may be distant from each other to stay connected 
by secure means. It is achieved by various methods like: Encrypting with an IPsec tunnel the link 
between the two different site-to-site connections, or by initiation and termination of the VPN tunnel to 
the organizations firewall implementation. This type of site-to-site VPN provides not only a secure 
connectivity between two organization segments, but also a secure link within the organization itself. 
Organizations choose to use this type of IPsec tunnel physical topology when setting up organizational 
extranets which enable multiple dedicated external connections to be made available to their remote 
users or other peer organizations (Bollapragada, 2005).  
2. Remote Access (RA) VPN provides mobility and flexibility for organizations by enabling remote access 
to offices environments. A secure connectivity is provided to any node that can establish a Layer 3 
connection to the corporate network (Cohen, 2003). 
3.
Within the Open Standard Interconnect (OSI) model there are many VPN technologies that operate on different 
layers while providing data protection services. Some of the most known VPN technologies that operate on different 
layers of the OSI model are: 
xLayer 2 of the VPDN: L2F, L2TP, PPTP 
xLayer 3 VPN: MPLS, L2TPv3, IPsec 
xLayer 4 VPN: SSL, TLS 
All of the above mentioned layers involves concept of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability for security over 
the network. Confidentiality means protecting of the data resource by restricting accessibility to one or more 
authorized people or systems only (Li, 2003). Integrity refers entirely to data and is ensuring that the data has not 
been altered by modifying or deleting in any way by an unauthorized party. Unlike confidentiality and integrity, 
which make the most sense in the context of the data contained within computer systems, availability refers to the 
“uptime” of computer-based services—the assurance that the service will be available when it’s needed. Service 
availability is usually protected by implementing high-availability (or continuous-service) controls on computers, 
networks, and storage. (Rhodes-Ousley, 2013). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 focuses on overview of IPSec suite of protocols, section 3 
offers a background research on work done related to comparative analysis of distributed database queries using 
different IPsec modes of encryption, section 4 introduces the finding and section 5 concludes this paper together 
with some outlined on future directions. 
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2. Overview on IPSec Suite of Protocols 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is unsecure by nature because all hosts on the network are easily discoverable. If used 
as such it doesn’t provide any Data integrity or confidentiality and leaves room for outside attacks like: Replay 
packets, Spoofing, reflection and dictionary attacks etc. IPsec as cryptography-based system depends on both the 
strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of the keys used with those algorithms, ensuring 
that there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the overall system. (Manral, 2007). IPsec 
provides Confidentiality by encrypting the data payload, Integrity by calculating at each communicating endpoint 
the checksum or hash value of the data exchanged and it provides Authentication through signatures and 
certificates.There are many VPN technologies developed that operate to protect data at different layers of the Open 
Standard Interconnect (OSI) model. MPLS VPN and the IPsec deployments are the most used implementations that 
run at the Layer 3 or the network layer. Figure 1 depicts the IPSec protocol suite components. 
Fig. 1. IP Security Protocol Suite Components 
IPsec is a VPN technology used by enterprises, service providers, governmental networks etc. It uses an ESP in 
tunnel mode while supporting an encrypted payload and thus preserving the QoS. Additional advantage to the IPsec 
is that it supports products from a wide range of vendors. IPsec is called a suite of Protocols because it combines, 
besides the core Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocols, other different 
components such as: Security Associations, Authentication Headers, Encapsulating Security Payload, and Internet 
Key Exchange service, as seen on the Figure above. IPsec provides interoperability features by enabling optional 
usage of its components. So an implementer may choose from a variety of options depending on the organizations 
requirements. 
There are two Core IPsec Protocols to provide Security or main options of usage:  
xEncapsulation Security Payload (ESP) 
xAuthentication Header (AH) 
The Authentication Header (AH) is an extension to the original message to provide security for the message 
authentication. This security protocol provides services such as integrity, data origin authentication and replay 
detection. It cannot provide confidentiality since the IP header is left unprotected. (Perkins, 1996) IPsec 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) provides encapsulation of the message header and is used for encryption only 
or encryption and authentication purposes. Depending on the options selected at the Security Association level, this 
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protocol is designated by the format of the IP packet and it provides services like: Access control, Connectionless 
Integrity, Data Origin Authentication, Rejection of replayed packets, Confidentiality, Limited traffic flow 
confidentiality etc. The ESP consists of a Header and trailer components (Kent, 2005).  
At the same time, there are two main modes of operation by which IPsec can be implemented:  
xTransport mode 
xTunnel mode  
To function properly, the AH and ESP either in Transport or Tunnel mode requires the support of other protocols 
and services such as: 
x Encryption/Hashing Algorithms AH and ESP are generic and do not specify the exact mechanism used for 
encryption. This gives them the flexibility to work with a variety of such algorithms and to negotiate which 
one to use as needed. Two common ones used with IPsec are Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash 
Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) (Pieprzyk, 1993).  
x Security Policies, Security Associations, and Management Methods since IPsec provides flexibility in 
letting different devices decide how they want to implement security; they require some means to keep 
track of the security relationships between themselves (Nikander, 2001).  
x Key Exchange Framework and Mechanism for two devices to exchange encrypted information, they need 
to be able to share keys for unlocking the encryption. They also need a way to exchange security 
association information. In IPsec, a protocol called the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) provides these 
capabilities. (Kozierok, 2005). 
An overview of transport mode and tunnel mode and their proprietary use of Authentication Header (AH), 
Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) and Authenticated ESP is given as in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2 Overview of Transport Mode and Tunnel Mode with various security features 
When implementing IPsec, a Security Policy must be in place to apply to IP packets that travel from source to 
destination. There are two main databases for this use: The Security Association Database (SAD) and the Security 
Policy Database (SPD). One definition of Security Associations is that it can name the security protocol (AH or 
ESP), specify symmetric algorithms and their mode of operation, include authentication keys and encryption keys, 
define key validity periods, and identify peer IP addresses. The security association attributes direct the processing 
of incoming security protocol packets, and they direct the security protocol processing for outgoing packets (Polk et 
al, 2011). 
The following parameters identify a Security Association: 
x Security Parameters Index (SPI): A bit string assigned to this SA and having local significance only. The 
SPI is carried in AH and ESP headers to enable the receiving system to select the SA under which a 
received packet will be processed. 
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x IP Destination Address: This is the address of the destination endpoint of the SA, which may be an end-
user system or a network system such as a firewall or router. 
x Security Protocol Identifier: This field from the outer IP header indicates whether the association is an AH 
or ESP security association. 
The protocol for the key exchange and SA negotiation is the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). For authentication 
purposes, the IKE may be used in conjunction with the Digital Signatures, Public-Key Encryption and Symmetric-
Key Encryption. On larger distributed networks, the Security associations facilitate automated creation and use of 
encryption keys. An automated setup of keys involves the following protocols: 
1. Oakley Key Determination Protocol: Oakley is a key exchange protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman 
algorithm that also provides for added security. Oakley is generic in that it does not dictate specific 
formats. 
2. Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP): ISAKMP provides a 
framework for Internet key management and provides the specific protocol support, including formats, 
for negotiation of security attributes. ISAKMP by itself does not involve a specific key exchange 
algorithm; instead ISAKMP consists of a set of message types that enables the use of various key 
exchange algorithms. Oakley is the specific key exchange algorithm mandated for use with the initial 
version of ISAKMP (Stallings, 2011). 
Main Protocols used for setting up a security association (SA) based on both Oakley protocol and ISAKMP are 
Internet Key Exchange Version 1 (IKEv1) and Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)Internet Key Exchange 1 
(IKEv1): The ISAKMP defines the two “phases” of operation, with phase 1 called the ISAKM bi-directional 
Security Association that involves authentication of the communicating peers and sharing of a secret key thus, 
establishing a secure communication channel. Phase 1 consists of “Main mode” and “Aggressive mode”. Phase 2 
involves the “Quick mode” negotiating Security associations on behalf of services such as IPsec. It is used to derive 
keying material and negotiate shared policy for non-ISAKMP SA’s. The entire payload but the ISAKMP header is 
encrypted (Hofmann, 2005). Internet Key Exchange 2 (IKEv2): The most recent RFC that covers the IKE2 is RFC 
7427 and it introduces IKE2 as an internet standard. IKE performs mutual authentication between two parties and 
establishes an IKE Security Association (SA) that includes shared secret information that can be used to efficiently 
establish SAs for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) or Authentication Header (AH) and a set of cryptographic 
algorithms to be used by the SA’s to protect the traffic that they carry (Kaufman, 2010). On the following section we 
will focus on some related work on tested implementation and analysis of distributed database queries using 
different IPsec modes of encryption. 
3. Related Work  
Concerning security aspects of database queries executed against distributed databases by utilizing various IPSec 
modes of encryption, different research have been conducted such as analyzing the performance of encryption 
algorithms from time and space complexity (Elkeelany et al, 2002) up to confidentiality protection by using 
encrypted query processing (Popa, 2011). The former approach presents a performance analysis and comparisons 
between symmetric encryption algorithms (DES) and cryptographic hash functions (MD5, SHA-1) from the 
perspective of time complexity and space complexity. Parameters considered for the comparison are CPU 
processing power and the size of the given input and the conclusion indicates that MD5 is sufficient for the 
authentication purposes rather than using the more complicated SHA-l algorithm (Elkeelany et al, 2002). However, 
considering the time of the research appearance, many serious security flaws are detected in MD5 after (Sotirov, 
2008) thus rendering the algorithms practically broken and inefficient for use. 
The latter approach can be seen in systems such as CryptDB (Popa, 2011).  CryptDB represents a system which 
offers practical, affordable and provable confidentiality against various attacks to applications backed by SQL 
databases. The mechanism lies in SQL queries over encrypted data which utilizes an efficient SQL-aware encryption 
schemes. CryptDB also tends to map encryption keys to user passwords, so that a particular data item can be 
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decrypted only by using the password from users that employ access to that data. Correspondingly, the database 
administrator never gains access to the decrypted data even when cases when servers are compromised. The system 
tends to offer a solid data protection, however it applicability to distributed databases remains unclear.  Other 
approaches involves using secure distributed queries are architectures that allows companies to outsource its data 
management processes in two untrusted servers while it preserves the data privacy in its database entities (Agrawal 
et al, 2005). The approach focuses on optimization and query execution on the proposed architecture as well as 
challenges that emerge in database schema design. Other methods focus on many other aspects (Özsu, 2011) such 
as: Query processing which targets the designing aspects of algorithms that analyze queries and convert them into a 
series of data manipulation operations. Query optimization: a problem on how to decide a good and cost-efficient 
strategy for executing each query over the network. Concurrency control which involves access synchronization to 
the distributed databases in a manner such that the integrity of the database is preserved. Finally, Reliability 
protocols like termination of transactions and their behavior before failures. All of the above mentioned approaches 
are categorized by a common lack of substantial comparative analysis of the effect of security from the sense 
distributed query execution over multiple databases with various records. This paper offers a set of simulated secure 
data communication tunnels and a comparison of results of the speed variables measured against the security 
through different encryption protocols between remote LAN’s, ran onto remote queries using select and insert 
database functions. 
4. Comparative Analysis on Distributed Database Queries Using Different IPSec Modes of Encryption 
This paper gives an overview of the internetworking concept that involve the Internet and the Transport layer of 
the Transmission Control Protocol TCP/IP reference model which enables communication between different 
endpoints into an abstraction of a single, uniform communication system. To achieve this goal we explore 
methodological issues based on experimental research by providing comparative analysis of outcomes involving a 
LAN-to-LAN VPN solution using an IPsec suite of protocols approach. 
4.1. An IPsec VPN Test-bed implementation 
 The aim of the testing and experimental environment was to achieve as much as possible exact conclusions 
against a simulated implementation of a VPN solution. This is done using IPsec modes of operation with IPsec 
security policy using the encryption keys and their management for secure data communication and whether they 
have a significant impact on the data transmission speed. 
The setup was built in accordance to the set of rules of VPN IPsec suite of protocols with the aim of fulfilling the 
requirements of: 
1. Successful VPN IPsec connection between two different LAN’s using VPN routers,  
2. Establishing a connection between C #applications built for the purpose of testing and a SQL database 
where both communicating parties are located on remote PC’s behind different LAN’s,  
3. Running of Database Select and Insert queries from LAN1 to LAN2 using the different IPsec modes of 
operation and encryptions, 
4. Comparing results 
Fig. 3 below illustrates the architecture of the IPsec VPN test-bed: 
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LAN1192.168.10.0subnet LAN2192.168.0.0subnet
Router1:TPͲlinkER6020Router2:TPͲLinkR600VPN
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Fig. 3 The architecture of the IPsec VPN test-bed implementation 
The following steps were carried in achieving the desired testing environment: 
x A .NET C# Program Interface to measure the running execution time of functions SELECT database 
records from VPN remote PC located behind a VPN IPsec Client2, and performing an INSERT function in 
the corresponding VPN IPsec Client1 located in a remote and separate network. 
x The C# program was connected to an SQL 2012 Database remotely: The open source Sample Database 
was taken from MONDIAL (May, 2001). A Cartesian product was run on the Mondial Database resulting 
in 1749150 records with execution time of 13 seconds. 
o In order to get a result of three data samples of database records, to be queried over a remote VPN 
IPsec implementation, a set of 1 thousand, 100 thousand and 1Milion records were picked and 
three different views were run over the VPN table. 
Both Routers A: TL-ER6020 VPN router and Router B: TL-R600VPN router used to establish the VPN IPsec 
connection must have the exact same setup on the following steps. Table 1 illustrates some features which make the 
IPsec suite and the steps that must be followed: 
Table 1 IPsec suite checklist - setup requirements 
IKE authentication proposal and IKE 
policy IPsec Proposal and Policy The IPsec Security Association (SA)  
Authentication mode and Exchange mode 
of keys 
Main or Aggressive 
Connection mode 
o Client-to-LAN, LAN-to-LAN Listing of IPsec policy name 
Local and Remote ID type Local and remote subnets Tunnel parties 
Pre- shared Key WAN IP address of the remote PC Subnets 
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SA lifetime and DFD intervals Security protocol to be used 
o AH or ESP Encryption Protocol 
Authentication algorithm 
MD5, SH1 etc. 
Authentication and Encryption to match the 
IKE proposal Authentication type 
Encryption algorithm 
DES, 3DES, AES etc. 
 Status 
The following is a representation of one of the IPsec VPN setups created: 
xLAN-to-LAN configuration 
xLAN 1 with local subnet range 192.168.0.0 
a) PC1 with client IP of 192.168.0.1 
xLAN 2 with local subnet range 192.168.10.0 
a) PC2 with client IP of 192.168.10.100 
xWAN modem in bridge mode 
x IKE1 and IKE2 phases 
xESP Protocol with 256 bit encryption,  
xMD5 Authentication algorithm 
xAggressive mode with Remote ID’s 
The test bed has been configured between two routers the configurations of which are shown in the following two 
subsections. 
4.1.1. Router A: TL-ER6020 VPN Router Configuration 
IKE proposal and policy is created by choosing the VPN tab on the router. The router is behind NAT on the 
WAN modem, so we select Aggressive Exchange mode with Remote ID’s to be used on both routers. The 
encryption is AES and here we also choose the Pre-shared key that will be used on both routers. Furthermore, an 
IPsec proposal is created and used to setup the IPsec policy. The Security encryption protocol and the 
Authentication protocol is the same as used on the IKE setup. The subnets must be inserted based on the LAN setup 
created beforehand. The WAN IP address of the remote router must be inserted. Finally, the Security Association 
feature which gives us an overview of our connection as well as ensures if the connection is successful, as illustrated 
below in Fig. 4: 
Fig. 4 Security Association for Router A 
4.1.2. Router B: TL-R600VPN Router Configuration 
On Router B we create subnet 2 with local IP address of 192.168.10.0 located behind LAN2. Initially, the IKE 
Policy is created which should correspond with Router A for the connection to be successful. Policies such as: the 
Exchange mode, Local/remote ID’s, the Security and Authentication algorithms and the pre-shared keys. Next, the 
IPsec policy is setup and subnets IP addresses must correspond with Router A and the WAN IP address should be of 
the Router A on the remote subnet. Also, features like the Security protocol, the Authentication and Encryption 
1946   Muhamed Elezi and Bujar Raufi  /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  195 ( 2015 )  1938 – 1948 
algorithm must correspond with the remote Router A. Last, we check on the SA tab of router 2 to ensure that 
everything is corresponding to Router 1 and that the status is connected as depicted in Fig. 5. 
Fig 5. Security Association for Router B 
After we ensure that the IPsec VPN connection is successfully established we proceed with the SQL ports of 
1433 and 1434 which are opened on the ISP provided WAN modem. Then we connect the C# application located in 
LAN1 with the SQL Mondial database located in LAN2. The Comparative analysis is done through measuring of 
timings that took for the C# application to query the database remotely by selecting the TOP 1000, TOP 100000 
and TOP 1 Million records from the VPN table and displaying them on the grid view. The query is run using ESP, 
AES 256 bit and MD5 cryptographic algorithms. Table 2 depicts all the IPsec setup scenarios all the estimated 
execution timings given in minutes. 
Table 2 A representation of all the IPsec implemented scenarios compared 
Nr. Of 
Records 
1. Local 
query
2. Remote query 
(ESP,AES 256 bit, 
MD5) 
3. Remote query 
(ESP,3DES, 
MD5) 
4. Remote query 
AH,3DES, SH1) 
5. Remote query 
(ESP,AES 128, 
MD5) 
6. Remote query 
(ESP,AES 256 bit, 
SH1) 
1000 0.0052 0.0221 0.0206 0.02065 0.0213 0.02187 
100000 1.0855973 1.254847867 1.200504792 1.19965743 1.238327401 1.240983901 
1 Million 8.1463928 13.3889304 12.55592639 12.5906838 13.35240783 13.38308887 
For the purposes of the paper, it is important to compare the remote queries. The remote queries where ESP 
security protocol is used the timings are much closer then when comparing ESP against AH security protocols.  
Namely, the AH is around 7% faster even though it is a protocol that doesn’t provide full confidentiality, however, 
here we setup an encrypted tunnel where the entire communication channel is secured. Hence, the execution timings 
differ only slightly. One other point to mention about Table 2, as a result of the execution timings measured, is the 
comparison of AH, 3DES with SH1 vs. ESP, 3DES MD5. Here the AH setup was slightly faster than ESP by <1% 
execution time. Figure 6 illustrates the different results gathered for diverse record size and encryption modes. 
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Fig 6. Comparative Results for Different Record Sizes and Encryption Modes 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Upon setting up of the encryption tunnel over separate LAN subnets connected by an ISP provided WAN 
modem, the results indicated that increasing the encryption causes significant decline in execution speed. In the 
smaller set of records of 1000, the difference between local and the remote encrypted query is high and significant 
regarding the time variable. For example: The local query showed 0.0052 minutes where the Remote query with 
details ESP protocol with AES encryption protocol of 256 bit and MD5 authentication protocol took 0.0221 
minutes, resulting in over 400% slower execution time when running the remote over the local query. Whereas 
running a query of 100000 records the remote query was only 15% slower. When a TOP 1 million queries was run 
remotely it required an execution time of over 61% more time compare to the time required to run it locally. 
Considering that the implementations involved creation of a secure encrypted channel using ESP and AH Security 
protocols, using AES, 3DES algorithms and MD5 and SH1 authentication algorithms, the higher the amount of 
records caused a higher execution times. For example: using the setup with ESP protocol with AES 256 bit and 
authentication with MD5: when querying TOP 1000 records it took only 0.0221 minutes whereas when running 
100000 records the result was 1.255 seconds execution time. The significant change was noticed with running of 1 
Million records where it took 13.389 minutes to execute. Comparing the highest execution time it showed that, when 
using the ESP security protocol, the AES 256 bit encryption, there was a slightly irrelevant difference in execution 
time in using a MD5 or SH1 authentication protocol. When using ESP with AES 256 and MD5 the results were 
0.0221, 1.255 and 13.389 minutes; compare to using ESP with AES 256 and SH1 the results were 0.0219, 1.241 and 
13.383 minutes. It can be seen that differences in time required to execute these remote queries is almost irrelevant 
and using MD5 vs. SH1 authentication protocol has no significant impact on execution speed. Comparing AES 128 
bit and 3DES encryption algorithms, it showed that when running remote queries up to 1 million records; 3DES was 
faster by 3.3%. With 1 million records the execution time was 6.3% faster. This shows that using different 
encryption algorithm can impact the speed by a margin of 6.3 % when running over 1 million records remotely.We 
can conclude that using a high encryption protocol impacts the speed significantly especially when running a high 
amount of data over remote networks, in our case 6.3%. This is not the case when using different authentication 
protocols where the execution speed difference is irrelevant, in our case only 0.005% faster execution time. So, 
using a different encryption algorithm has more impact than using different authentication algorithm. 
xThere are aspects of this thesis which can be taken further. Here are a few of them:  
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xManagement of the encryption keys as an important part of the communication security;  
xRunning remote queries on different operating system platforms i.e. to compare security over speed on 
Windows against Linux platforms;  
xEstablishing of a cloud repository implementation of automated authentication keys would present a 
significant improvement of the speed and security of communication channels. 
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